This paper is an attempt to extend the meaning of the concept of indeterminacy for the human sciences. The authors do this by coining the term methodological indeterminacy and arguing that indeterminacy is better understood when linked to specific methodological techniques. Paradoxically, while specific research techniques demonstrate that the issue of indeterminacy is complex, yielding the possibility of types and degrees, it does not eliminate the problem of translation first raised by Quine. However, the authors go on to argue that, (...) from a research perspective, indeterminacy can and must be approached in such a way that it is possible to reduce cases of it, even though never completely eliminating it in the human sciences. (shrink)

This paper attempts to clarify the meaning and significance of "qualitative confirmation". The need to do so is related to the fact that, without such a conceptualization, a large portion of the human sciences are relegated to a less than scientific status. Accordingly, "qualitative confirmation" is viewed as a proper subset of traditional confirmation theory. To establish such a case, a general Hempelian framework is utilized, but it is supplemented with two additional levels of confirmation. It is concluded that the (...) final test for adequacy of such confirmation must rest on a subjective probability notion. (shrink)

The article argues for the possibility of translation manuals having an implicit internal structure. This structure is composed of specific methodological assumptions and techniques. Using the (N)-type and (G)-type distinction developed by Fuller for the study of scientific behavior, it is shown that these are incomplete characterizations of translation manuals. A more complete characterization must involve an analysis of how the presence or absence of methodological rules influences the interpretation of specific research questions. It is further argued that while Quine's (...) original indeterminacy thesis cannot be completely rejected, in some cases it can be modified to reflect the importance of the methodological constraints. Finally, it is suggested that the more critical analysis of translation manuals will benefit the on-going debates in the study of scientific behavior. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to explore some of the non-obvious characteristics of the social science research-social policy (SSRSP) paradigm. We examine some of the underlying assumptions of the readily accepted claim that social science research can lead to the creation of rational social policy. We begin by using the framework of meta-analysis as one of the most powerful means of informing policy by way of empirical research findings. This approach is critiqued and found wanting in several ways. Several (...) conceptual and definitional issues connected to the term “policy” are explored as well. A central argument is that even the best social science research is no guarantee of enlightened policymaking because the very (inductive) basis of empirical research militates against the possibility of going from research findings to policy. This claim is explored within the context of a central paradox. This paradox is explored in some depth. Finally, within the SSRSP claim, we analyze related issues such as the possibility of utilizing Mixed Methods and the politics of policymaking. We conclude that the SSRSP framework is, at best, a subjective one which ironically is needed, but one which is constrained by the very methods that is uses to formulate policy. (shrink)

The analysis here is an attempt to show how the current epistemological theory of response‐dependence (R‐D) may be relevant to understanding putative ontological claims of the empirical social sciences. To this end I argue that the constitutive features of human response, central to R‐D theory, can be made explicit for social science. I conclude that for the empirical social sciences the implication of combining R‐D and certain forms of statistical analyses leads to the possibility of an events‐based ontology.

Roth's analysis of the Rationalitätstreit (i.e., the debate(s) about rationality) stands as one of the major works on how the debate affects a wide range of issues in the philosophy of science and the social sciences. His principal thesis is that the debate may be seen as a series of Quine-type "translation manuals," exhibiting characteristics of paradigms (following Kuhn 1970) that can be treated as testable scientific theories by adequate empirical tests. The author argues that Roth's notion of empirically testing (...) translation manuals is not possible given his criteria. He suggests a clearer definition of "methods" and develops a case whereby translation manuals can be adequately tested within an inductive model-but with rather severe restrictions. Implications are indicated. (shrink)

abstract This article attempts to illustrate the continuing need to pay attention to ontological issues connected with the conduct of empirical research and subsequent policy making. Failure to do so leads to the conflation of social constructions with ideas about the thesis of an independent reality. Such category mistakes often lead to dilemmas in which culturally sensitive constructs may, on the one hand, be worthy of study because they do tell us how socially constructed categories do predict social phenomena; but, (...) on the other hand, such constructs may illustrate an unwillingness on the part of the research community to recognize the objective nature of such constructs. Some recommendations are suggested for addressing the social policy consequences of these dilemmas. (shrink)

The movement to assess teacher competency is becoming a central concern for professional educators, state departments of education, and the public. The major underlying assumption of this concern is that primary and secondary school-aged children are falling far behind in basic skills as compared with their counterparts in other countries. A further concern is that, within this country, variability in teacher competency may exacerbate differences among children of various socioeconomic, racial and ethnic backgrounds and thus perpetuate long-term educational and economic (...) inequalities. To support these assumptions, critics of teacher preparation institutions cite declining SAT and ACT test scores of those entering teacher training, and also this constitutes sufficient grounds for assuming that becoming a teacher is less intellectually demanding than preparing for other fields. (shrink)

A major problem of teaching philosophy to children, in both the public and private sectors, is that the large proportion of children who could benefit by such instruction are never exposed to it. This is the result of many factors including teachers who are not prepared in philosophy, the resistance or inability of schools to offer such instruction, and the unwillingness of philosophers to involve themselves in these kinds of enterprises. Many times the only exposure prospective teachers receive is an (...) undergraduate course in the philosophy of education. And in many instances where even this course is not required, teachers are not introduced to philosophical thinking until they begin their graduate studies. Even here there is often only a one course requirement, and, in any case, the applicability of philosophy to educational practice is often lost by this time. (shrink)

The article is an attempt to better understand the objections to the doctrine of 'reliabilism' made by prominent epistemologists. The view argued for here is that while one extreme case of anti-reliabilism seems to be the paradigm case against the entire concept, this very case points out some additional, and implicit, problems with the standard account of epistemic justification. The most notable is that the standard view attacks reliabilism on the grounds that it lacks a means of giving adequate reasons (...) or evidence for its claims. We argue that the standard view, while correct on its paradigm case against reliabilism, is itself weakened by its lack of recognition of the central role theories of evidence must play in its basic account. Since theories of evidence are themselves divergent and problematic in terms of explaining how claims are justified, the standard account needs to address the issues of which account of evidence is 'adequate' and why it is. It is finally suggested that traditional epistemology might be more accurately described as a branch of confirmation theory. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to examine the applicability of the theory of projection for Anthropological hypotheses. The claim is made that Goodman's classic statement of the problem does not apply in its entirety to actual Anthropological hypotheses. The recent Freeman-Mead debate is employed as a framework for the discussion, illustrating that the issue of projectibility, while central for the social sciences, is best used as a backdrop to illustrate several important methodological problems. For Anthropology, and other related social (...) sciences, the central methodological problem, which is directly related to the projectibility one, is the development and justification of evidence-rules that can be used for a theory of confirmation. A preliminary attempt is then made to articulate the nature of these rules within the general Hempelian framework of qualitative confirmation. (shrink)

This article argues that the emerging field of Mixed Methods faces a series of challenges which must be addressed before the area can fulfill its potential. Foremost among these is the lack of attention given to ontological concerns. Specifically, Mixed Methods must examine what ontological commitments are made as the result of employing the range of typologies now discovered. It is argued that Mixed Methods presently lacks a clear conception of how its paradigm is significantly different from non-mixed methodological approaches. (...) It is suggested that Mixed Methods adopt a “weak” minimal realist ontological stance that is rooted in a position called “measured realism.” It is also argued that such a position is required since the present reliance on pragmatism does not sufficiently address ontological concerns. Suggestions are made, by way of an empirical research example, as to plausible ways to handle the issue of ontological commitment. (shrink)

Since publication of the 1986 Carnegie Commission report, A Nation Prepared: Teachers for the 21st Century, the professional teaching standards movement has gained noticeable momentum. The professional standards movement in teaching has been fueled by national organizations such as the National Council for Accreditation of Teacher Education, the Interstate New Teachers Assessment and Support Consortium, the National Board for Professional Teaching Standards, the National Commission on Teaching and America's Future, and by close collaboration among these four entities. Further, nearly all (...) of the fifty states are embracing the professional standards movement through formal participation in the work of one or more of these organizations. Although the professional standards movement in teaching is strong and growing stronger, its implications are not clear for instructional programs in social foundations of education, either at the teacher preparation or the advanced graduate levels. In response to the standards movement, social foundations educators have a number of options before them, three of which are to (1) largely ignore these developments, as "this too shall pass"; (2) critically interpret and resist these developments through scholarship and collective professional action, as social foundations scholars did with Competency Based Teacher Education in the 1970s; and (3) critically interpret these developments while working to strengthen the potential of the professional teaching standards movement to achieve its stated goal of providing caring and qualified teachers for every classroom in the nation. Of these three options, the last is most advisable, but it presents a considerable challenge to social foundations educators. Although the absence of social foundations skills, perspectives, and understanding should make it very difficult for teacher candidates and teachers to perform well on standards-based teaching assessments, there is no guarantee that these assessments will hold candidates accountable for social foundations learning. Implications for social foundations educators and activists are significant. (shrink)

Theoretical models propose that attentional biases might account for the maintenance of social anxiety symptoms. However, previous eye-tracking studies have yielded mixed results. One explanation i...

David Miller propounds a theory of objective knowledge from which he mistakenly derives some consequences about question-begging and persuasion that appear to be false. He makes a further claim about persuasion that also seems false. I argue that Miller’s account of objective knowledge is explanatorily weak unless supplemented with an account of subjective knowledge and that the latter enables us to extricate Miller’s theory from the falsehoods he associates with it.

This book approaches Hegel from the standpoint of what we might call the question of knowledge. Hegel, of course, had no "theory of knowledge" in the narrow and abstract sense in which it has come to be understood since Locke and Kant. "The examination of knowledge," he holds, "can only be carried out by an act of knowledge," and "to seek to know before we know is as absurd as the wise resolution of Scholasticus, not to venture into the water (...) until he had learned to swim. " * While Hegel wrote no treatise exclusively devoted to epistemology, his entire philosophy is nonetheless a many-faceted theory of truth, and thus our title - Beyond Epistemology - is meant to suggest a return to the classical meaning and relation of the terms episteme and logos. I had originally planned to include a lengthy introduction for these essays, setting out Hegel's general view of philosophic truth. But as the papers came in, it became clear that I had chosen my contributors too well; indeed, they have all but put me out of business. In any case, it gives me great pleasure to have been able to gather this symposium of outstanding Hegel scholars, to provide for them a forum on a common theme of great importance, and especially, thanks to Arnold Miller, to have Hegel himself among them. Frederick G. Weiss Charlottesville, Va. • The Logic of Hegel, trans. from the Etu;yclopaedta by William Wallace. 2nd ed. (shrink)

In addressing thescientific study of consciousness, Crick and Koch state, It is probable that at any moment some active neuronal processes in your head correlate with consciousness, while others do not: what is the difference between them? (1998, p. 97). Evidence from electrophysiological and brain-imaging studies of binocular rivalry supports the premise of this statement and answers to some extent, the question posed. I discuss these recent developments and outline the rationale and experimental evidence for the interhemispheric switch hypothesis of (...) perceptual rivalry. According to this model, the perceptual alternations of rivalry reflect hemispheric alternations, suggesting that visual consciousness of rivalling stimuli may be unihemispheric at any one time (Miller et al., 2000). However, in this paper, I suggest that interhemispheric switching could involve alternating unihemispheric attentional selection of neuronal processes for access to visual consciousness. On this view, visual consciousness during rivalry could be bi hemispheric because the processes constitutive of attentional selection may be distinct from those constitutive of visual consciousness. This is a special case of the important distinction between the neuronal correlates and constitution of visual consciousness. (shrink)

David Miller claims that every valid deductive argument begs the question. Other philosophers and logicians have made similar claims. I show that the claim is false. Its appeal depends on the existence of logical terminology, particularly concerning what a proposition 'contains' or its 'logical content,' that is best understood as metaphoric and that, given its aptness to mislead, would be better eschewed. I show how the terminology appears to derive from early modern theories of the nature of mind, ideas (...) and reasoning that have since been rejected. (shrink)

David Miller argues that there are no good reasons, either sufficient or insufficient. I show that most of his arguments are invalid or unsound. Several of his arguments depend upon the false claim that every deductively valid argument is circular. I accept one of Miller's arguments for the conclusion that there are no good reasons which are less-than-sufficient. I accept one of his arguments to the conclusion that there are no probative sufficient reasons. But I explain how there (...) are epistemic sufficient reasons which are relative to the game of science and how their existence is consistent with Miller's main contentions while avoiding Miller's apparently anarchic account of our knowledge. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Open Letter to the Enemy:Jean Genet's Holy WarSteven Miller (bio)J.G. seeks, or is searching for, or would like to discover, never to uncover him, the delicious enemy, quite disarmed, whose equilibrium is unstable, profile uncertain, face inadmissible, the enemy broken by a breath of air, the already humiliated slave, ready to throw himself out the window at the least sign, the defeated enemy: blind, deaf, mute. With no (...) arms, no legs, no stomach, no heart, no sex, no head, all told a complete enemy, already bearing all the marks of my bestiality that now need never be used (too lazy anyway). I want the total enemy, with immeasurable and spontaneous hatred for me, but also the subjugated enemy, defeated by me before he even knows me. Not to be reconciled with me, in any case. No friends. Above all, no friends: a declared enemy, but not a tortured one. Clean, faultless. What are his colors? From a green as tender as a cherry to an effervescent violet. His size? Between the two of us, he presents himself to me man to man. No friends. I seek an inadequate enemy, one who comes to capitulate. I will come at him with all that I can muster: whacks, slaps, kicks, I will feed him to starving foxes, make him eat English food, attend the House of Lords, be received at Buckingham Palace, fuck Prince Phillip, and be fucked by him, live for a month in London, dress like me, sleep in place of me, live in place of me: I seek the declared enemy.This brief text was not published until 1991. It was almost published in 1975 in a book of homages to William Burroughs and Brion Gysin, and was to have been preceded with the following explanation of its origins, written by Gysin:In Tangiers in 1970, Jean Genet asked me what ever happened to the English underground newspaper The International Times. When I responded that the editors were having trouble with the law in England because of the newspaper's ads for "special friendships" [amitiés particulières], he exclaimed: "Why friends? Personally, I am looking for a suitable enemy [un ennemi à ma taille]." He then wrote the following text...[qtd. in Genet, ED 9]Hence the anecdotal reason for the form of the personal advertisement. In 1991 the text was published—according to Genet's wishes—as the first page of the posthumous collection of his political writings and interviews, L'ennemi déclaré.1 Such a placement demands more than an anecdotal explanation. What is a personal ad doing as the preface to a collection of political writings? Albert Dichy, the editor of the collection, notes that this text has the status of an exception: "the text that opens the collection does not belong to the group of writings that make up the book as a whole" [ED 331]. Each of the other texts emerges from Genet's involvement in specific political events (the [End Page 85] 1968 Chicago Democratic National Convention, the Chatila massacre) or with named political figures and groups (the Palestinians, the Black Panthers, the Baader-Meinhof group, George Jackson, Angela Davis), whereas the form of the ad that he wrote for Gysin seems to number it among his literary works. Nonetheless, this eccentric text remains the first in the collection—"en tête de l'ouvrage," is Dichy's phrase—and gives the book its title. Rather than serving as an introduction to the other texts, this text, by virtue of its exceptional form, is a challenge addressed directly to the public. Dichy himself is the first to accept this challenge. His editorial notice passes quickly from anecdote to interpretation:The fact that Genet wished to see the publication of his political articles preceded by this precise text has an unavoidable impact, not only on the identity of the author, now partially assimilable to a fictional character ("J.G. cherche, ou recherche..."), but also on the way in which we read the different texts in the collection, now that we have been given the general tone and the note of secrecy.[ED 331]These suggestions are apt enough... (shrink)

Larry A. Hickman and Albert Borgmann have carried on a decades-long debate about the status and value of technological practices. Hickman’s work develops from the thought of John Dewey. A recent essay alleges that Hickman’s engagement with Borgmann has been superficial, particularly because full engagement would involve admitting that Dewey’s instrumentalist theory of inquiry and his aesthetics are at odds. This paper argues not only that Hickman has attended to the full scope of Borgmann’s thought but also that Dewey is (...) innocent of the criticism charged. Along the way, I develop a critique of the traditionalistic nostalgia implicit in accounts like Borgmann’s. This all serves to address the longstanding concern that pragmatism can be reduced to a crass form of instrumentalism. (shrink)

The work of Alain Badiou attempts to refound the project of Western philosophy by returning to the platonic celebration of mathematics as the basis for any transmissible knowledge. In “The New Man's Fetish,” Tracy McNulty shows that Badiou's return to Plato is secretly mediated by the French libertine tradition. Badiou derives the militant figure of mathematics less from Plato than from Lautréamont—in whose “Songs of Maldoror” she (mathematics) appears as a stern mistress. Reading McNulty, within the framework of psychoanalytic debates (...) around the clinic of perversion, I show that McNulty's emphasis upon this mediation, despite appearances, functions less to undermine the authority of Badiou's philosophical project than to raise the stakes of perversion. Taking Badiou's libertinism seriously makes it possible to grasp how perversion strives to formalize the death drive and thus to open politics and philosophy to the future. At the same time, McNulty shows that Badiou's theory of number makes it possible to rethink the distinctions between number, trope, figure, and fetish; and thus to reopen a discussion of the relationships between philosophy, psychoanalysis, and literature. (shrink)

The analysis is a reflection of Alston’s contention (in response to Putnam’s conceptual relativity) that much of what we assert or believe carries no real ontological commitment. I place these remarks in the context of the social sciences, and attempt to show for the special sciences the condition holds true. The major reason for this is that our notions of “collective intentionality” (Searle) or “weakly conceiver-independent” (Moser) reality depends on the successful blocking of a regress problem. Because this problem has (...) not been sufficiently addressed, what passes as an ontological commitment is in effect a clever semantic equivalence. (shrink)

Karl Popper lamented the prevalence of dogmatic argument in philosophy and commended the kind of critical argument that is found in the sciences. David Miller criticises the uncritical nature of so-called critical thinking because of its attachment to dogmatic arguments. I expound and clarify Popper’s distinction between critical and dogmatic arguments and the background to it. I criticise some errors in Miller’s discussion. I reaffirm the need for philosophers to eschew dogmatic arguments in favour of critical ones.

Due to the impact of biomedical technologies on human wellbeing, biomedical engineering presents discipline-specific ethical issues that can have global, economic, environmental, and societal consequences. Because ethics instruction is a component of accredited undergraduate engineering programs in the US, we developed an ethics assignment that provided biomedical engineering students with a framework for ethical decision-making and challenged them to critically reflect on ethical issues related to contemporary medical devices. Thematic analysis performed on student reflections (n = 73) addressed two research (...) questions: (i) what considerations do biomedical engineering undergraduates describe when asked to critically reflect on ethical issues related to contemporary medical devices; and (ii) how do students describe their participation in bioethical discussions? Students described design, economic factors, and empathy most frequently as considerations. Further, students reported confidence in their ability to engage in ethical discussion upon assignment completion. Overall, our analysis builds understanding of student attitudes and engagement to help inform future ethics curriculum development. (shrink)

I offer an interpretation of John Stuart Mill's theory of higher and lower pleasures in his Utilitarianism. I argue that the quality of pleasure is best understood as the density of pleasure per unit of delivery. Mill is illustrated with numerous beer examples.

The doctrine that the content of the conclusion of a deductively valid argument is included in the content of its premises, taken jointly, is a familiar one. It has important consequences for the question of what value valid arguments possess, since it indicates the poverty of three traditional answers: that arguments may and should be used as instruments of persuasion, that they may and should be used as instruments of justification; and that they may and should be used to advance (...) knowledge. The truth is, however, that in each of these cases the argument has only a managerial role and, if there is any work done, it is the premises that do it. It will be maintained that this point has little force against the critical rationalist answer, which I shall defend, that the principal purpose of deductive reasoning from an assemblage of premises is the exploration of their content, facilitating their criticism and rejection. That said, the main aim of the present paper is not to promote critical rationalism but to consider some published objections to the doctrine that a statement asserts every statement that is validly deducible from it. The alleged counterexamples to be considered fall roughly into two groups: statements that emerge with time from a rich mathematical or empirical theory, but were originally unformulated and are deducible from the theory only in a non-trivial way (Frederick 2011, 2014; Williamson 2012); and statements, notably disjunctions, that are easily formulated and are deducible from a theory in a trivial way (Schurz & Weingartner 1987; Mura 1990, 2008; Gemes 1994; Yablo 2014). Each of these counterexamples will be evaluated and dismissed. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that one way to approach what is known in the literature as the “Trust Gap” in Medical AI is to focus on explanations from an Explainable AI (xAI) perspective. Against the current framework on xAI – which does not offer a real solution – we argue for a pragmatist turn, one that focuses on understanding how we provide explanations in Traditional Medicine (TM), composed by human agents only. Following this, explanations have two specific relevant components: (...) they are usually (i) social and (ii) abductive. Explanations, in this sense, ought to provide understanding by answering contrastive _why-questions_: “Why had P happened instead of Q?” (Miller in AI 267:1–38, 2019) (Sect. 1 ). In order to test the relevancy of this concept of explanation in medical xAI, we offer several reasons to argue that abductions are crucial for medical reasoning and provide a crucial tool to deal with trust gaps between human agents (Sect. 2 ). If abductions are relevant in TM, we can test the capability of Artificial Intelligence systems on this merit. Therefore, we provide an analysis of the capacity for social and abductive reasoning of different AI technologies. Accordingly, we posit that Large Language Models (LLMs) and transformer architectures exhibit a noteworthy potential for effective engagement in abductive reasoning. By leveraging the potential abductive capabilities of LLMs and transformers, we anticipate a paradigm shift in the integration of explanations within AI systems. This, in turn, has the potential to enhance the trustworthiness of AI-driven medical decisions, bridging the Trust Gap that has been a prominent challenge in the field of Medical AI (Sect. 3 ). This development holds the potential to not only improve the interpretability of AI-generated medical insights but also to guarantee that trust among practitioners, patients, and stakeholders in the healthcare domain is still present. (shrink)

The field of business ethics has shown little attention to the dynamics of memory in maintaining moral character. Yet memory is a complex process that involves the repression of some experiences in order to protect the moral integrity of the personality. Without the capacity to repress what one's moral conscience would not accept, the mind can be overtaken by neurotic ambivalence and moral confusion. In the context of business competition, where the pressures for potential gains and losses can be immense, (...) long repressed desires can receive renewed strength resulting in a weakening of moral constraint. In this essay, I use the psycho-analytic theory of repression to investigate the complex, psychological vicissitudes of human memory. The theory of repression is a particularly powerful tool to investigate the moral implications of memory because memories which are repressed - i.e., forbidden consciousness - are done so at the behest of the individual's moral ideals. Experiences that offend these ideals or threaten the integrity of the ego can be repressed. Repression, then, is an infallible index of moral judgement. I will apply the theory of repression to the characters in and story line of Arthur Miller's play "Death of a Salesman" to elucidate the relationship between memory and ethics in business. "Death of a Salesman" is well suited for this purpose because the memories of the main characters are central to the play and are inextricably linked to the moral challenge competition in business poses. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Double Exposure: Cutting Across Buddhist and Western DiscoursesSteven HeineDouble Exposure: Cutting Across Buddhist and Western Discourses. By Bernard Faure. Translated by Janet Lloyd. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004. Pp. xiv + 174. Hardcover $49.50. Paper $21.95.In some ways, Double Exposure: Cutting Across Buddhist and Western Discourses by Bernard Faure seems quite different from other publications by this author, including several books that were also translated from the (...) French such as Visions of Power and Will to Orthodoxy, which have a specific focus on the practice of Chan or on gender issues in Buddhism. Double Exposure deals with broad, wide-ranging philosophical themes concerning Buddhist thought set in comparative contexts with Western intellectual history since the Enlightenment, especially continental European philosophy. Faure is well known from previous works for his extensive explorations of poststructural theory in examining historical and doctrinal buddhological issues. Clearly, however, this book was intended primarily not for Buddhist studies scholars but for an audience of French intellectuals and cultural critics, encompassing but more diverse than the academic community, who wish to understand how the discourse of Buddhism pertains to, yet remains distinct from, their own recent history of thought. Rather than citing a particular set of poststructural thinkers to illuminate Buddhism, Faure does the converse and uses Buddhism to make key points about the development of Western thought.At the same time, Double Exposure is consistent with and an extension of Faure's earlier books in that it tracks the role of the twofold or double in its various manifestations both in Buddhist thought and in methodological approaches to interpreting Buddhism. Faure is endlessly fascinated by and delights in exposing the fact that the Buddhist tradition, nwhich claims to espouse a standpoint of nondualism, invariably and inevitably divvies reality up into an endless series of polarities and paradoxes regarding the apparent oppositions or contradictions between the realms of nirvāṇa and samsāṃra, karmic causality and transcendence of karma, ultimate and mundane reality (or two levels of truth), and sudden and gradual enlightenment. He asserts: "The history of Buddhism... seems to be governed by what Bergson, in The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, suggested calling the 'law of dichotomy,' a law which apparently brings about a realization, by a mere splitting, of tendencies which began by being two views, so to speak, of one and the same tendency" (p. 124). [End Page 178]In addition to Bergson, Faure cites classical notions like the Platonic division between the ideal form and the world of concrete forms, the two-faced Roman god Janus who rules over past and future, and the Manichaean split between good and evil. Faure also emphasizes more recent French thinkers and scholars, including Emile Beneviste, Nayla Farouki, Michel Foucault, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Henri Micheaux, among others, who in probing the "diabolical" sense of truth versus error, which are considered eternal contraries in Western thought, especially in Christianity, are useful for discussing parallels and differences with Buddhism.Double Exposure also discusses interpretive debates about whether Buddhism should be seen as epitomizing agnosticism versus mysticism, pragmatism versus supernaturalism, or rationalism versus mythology, as well as conflicts in using the method of psychology as opposed to anthropology and the impact of hidden, or not-so-hidden Orientalist and reverse Orientalist tendencies. Perhaps the best organized chapter in the book is "The Major Schools" (chapter 5), which offers a quick but insightful overview of early Buddhist realism, Yogācāra idealism, the Mādhyamika middle way, and Chan's compromise between immanence and transcendence. The most imaginative section is "External Thought" (chapter 8), which delves into a vast array of topics. These range from Tantric sexuality as a form of spiritual energy and Diderot's view of the perpetual shifting of ordinary thought to Zongmi's image of the bright pearl as a metaphor for sudden realization compared with Paul Claudel's own pearl metaphor in Conversations dans le Loir-et-Cher, which evokes a gradual path of self-understanding.I think Faure's main aim in all his many publications is to explore and expose the wedges, gaps, and inconsistencies, without making a judgment other than to underscore that what... (shrink)

Husserl describes arithmetic as a branch of formal ontology. It is an ontology because its goal is to lay out the essential truths about a region of objects, and it is formal because the determinate region of number deals with a characteristic of every possible object. The mathematical experience proper requires something more than the constitution of "concrete numbers" in acts of collecting and counting, for its objects are "ideal numbers" that emerge from eidetic variation over corresponding concrete numbers. With (...) remarkable clarity, Miller coordinates Husserl's various writings on the nature of number by stressing the key theme of identity in presence and absence. Concrete numbers are "determinate multitudes" which are not presented in sensuous intuition, but rather in sensuously founded categorial operations, i.e., explication, in which the parts of an indiscriminately given whole are explicitly articulated as parts, and comparison, in which the multitude generated through such explication is explicitly related to other multitudes. These operations account for the original presence of number. But we can intend numbers in their absence as well as in their presence. For example we may intend a determinate multitude in the absence of the sensuous group in question, or we may experience a different mode of absence when an intended number is frustrated by subsequent intuitive registration, or we may deploy the distinctive absence generated by signs in the process of calculating without authentic articulation of the relevant determinate multitudes. The presence of ideal numbers requires the free play of fantasy, for we must imagine collections of items and also imagine ourselves counting the items in order to disengage their purely formal character. We must discern an identical presence of "four" in a cluster of persons, a collection of apples, and even in some arbitrarily contrived group such as a "feeling, an angel, the moon, Italy." The absence of generic community in the latter example helps us to appreciate what Husserl means by the purely formal nature of arithmetic. Formal ontology is not restricted in scope to some particular region, but is concerned with properties that belong to every possible object precisely as such. Thus, whereas Euclidean geometry is a regional ontology, set-theory and number-theory must be considered as branches of formal ontology, for the basic concepts of these disciplines are strictly formal. Anything that can be thought of can be counted. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that deliberative democrats have too narrow a conception of the political, but that 'activism' as it is normally understood is not sufficiently broad, either. Politics is not reducible to coercion and contestation, but rather to the constitution of our shared world. We contend that active citizenship more often takes the form of working in a rape crisis center or a domestic violence clinic than participating in marches or town meetings.

Socializing Metaphysics supplies diverse answers to the basic questions of social metaphysics, from a broad array of voices. It will interest all philosophers and social scientists concerned with mind, action, or the foundations of social theory.

While experience tells us that time flows from the past to the present and into the future, a number of philosophical and physical objections exist to this commonsense view of dynamic time. In an attempt to make sense of this conundrum, philosophers and physicists are forced to confront fascinating questions, such as: Can effects precede causes? Can one travel in time? Can the expansion of the Universe or the process of measurement in quantum mechanics define a direction in time? In (...) this book, researchers from both physics and philosophy attempt to answer these issues in an interesting, yet rigorous way. This fascinating book will be of interest to physicists and philosophers of science and educated general readers interested in the direction of time. (shrink)